

GENERATIONS AND NANA SUMBADZE VALUES

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და ღირსებულებები



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თაობები და ღირებულებები
GENERATIONS AND VALUES

საზოგადოებრივი პოლიტიკის ინსტიტუტი
Institute for Policy Studies



თბილისი
2012
Tbilisi

ავტორების მიერ გამოთქმული მოსაზრება არ გამოხატავს ფონდის „ღია საზოგადოება-საქართველო“ პოზიციას. შესაბამისად, ფონდი არ არის პასუხისმგებელი მასალის შინაარსზე.

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პროექტი განხორციელებულია ფონდის:
„ღია-საზოგადოება – საქართველო“ მხარდაჭერით
The project is supported by Open Society Georgia Foundation

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ISBN 978-9941-0-4604-9

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Individual values are defined principally by historical time, life-cycle, culture and personality. Drastic changes in the social, political and economic environment usually challenge existing values and cause them to change. The events of the past two decades in Georgia have drastically changed both the political and economic environments. Social transformation usually initiates a process of value change and if this indeed was the case it should be reflected in the values of the young, the generation which was brought up in the changed environment.

Values generally refer to “what is desirable, deeply engrained standards that determine future directions and justify past actions” (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991, p.661). The study of values of distinct generations is important in itself, as contributes to our knowledge about the motivational forces of different generations in a specific society and historical period. It also contributes to our understanding of the similarities and differences between generations and provides insights on the possible trajectory of the development of society (Inglehart, 1997). For Georgia this is especially important for identifying the challenges faced by the country’s development as a democracy.

Two value orientations, *Individualism – Collectivism* and *Materialistic –Post-Materialistic* have been selected for the study along with other values associated with them. A number of other, stand-alone values that apply to issues such as health, education and religion have also been assessed. Factors linked with values such as generalized trust, optimism, economic well-being, life satisfaction, self-esteem and others have also been included in the study.

The method used for this value study was a nationwide survey using questionnaires, with 1058 total respondents. It was carried out from November 21, 2011 to December, 19, 2011 in all the regions of the country and targeting three generations aged 18-24, 40-50 and 60 – 70.

Individualism-Collectivism

Individualism – Collectivism is one of the most important value orientations, describing both society and an individual. Individualistic culture assumes an abundance of individuals whose self-concept is that of a relatively stable, individual, personality features, less dependent on others, while the self-concept of people in Collectivistic culture is determined more by their roles and belonging to the group.

- The study showed intergenerational differences. A tendency towards collectivistic orientation increases with the age, but is not accompanied by a decrease of Individualistic orientation. Older adults have higher scores on one of the two Individualistic sub-scales, namely on self-reliance, which could be attributed to the joint effect of age and culture – in Georgia independence from the family is gained at an older age than in the West. It can also be the effect of the process of social transition in the shift from Collectivism to Individualism.
- Differences are obvious in other values associated with the Individualism-Collectivism orientation. Favoring traditionalism, family coherence and bringing children up to be obedient are all much more valued by older adults, while younger generations value independence and determination more.

Materialistic and Post-Materialistic values

According to the Modernization theory, on which is based to a great extent the concept of the Materialistic and Post-Materialistic value orientation (Inglehart, 1997), modernization tends to increase economic efficiency, the development of economics, bureaucracy and science. Post-Modernization, although not negating these values, prioritizes self-expression, freedom of choice and individual well-being.

- The majority of respondents adhere to the mixed values, selecting most often one Materialistic: “Maintaining order in nation “ and one Post-Materialistic value, “Protecting freedom

of speech". Share of mixed and Post-Materialistic values is higher among younger generation.

- Attitudes towards democracy as a form of governance and to its components, i.e. participation in decision making, the possibility of expressing one's own position and being equal before the law are universally adhered to.
- Gender equality and tolerance towards minorities is higher among youth. The only exception is their attitude towards other religions. Where it is the lowest.
- Generalized trust, membership in voluntary organizations and the value of exerting influence on decisions, which are considered as preconditions of democracy are very low in all generations.
- Education, which is a key resource for democratic development, is rather high. Half of those surveyed are computer users, especially among the youth.
- Young people estimate the economic condition of their families more favorably than older ones and show more economic optimism. The income of youth depends more on private enterprise while that of older adults on the state sector.

Religion

The importance of religion drastically increased after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

- Religion is more important for the younger generations and young people more than older adults base their identity on religion.
- Religion offers a chance for social activities more for young respondents than for the older adults and more youth make up congregations.
- Compared to older adults, young people demonstrate less tolerance towards other denominations

Other values

- Health, family and home comprise core values.
- Young people value leisure, friends, religion, work and education, more than older adults who more than young people value politics and public life.
- Compared to older adults, young people express higher life satisfaction, reveal more self-confidence and happiness, and have a more optimistic outlook.

Results unequivocally demonstrated intergenerational differences although to a different extent for most values studied. The difference most often was of a linear character – estimations increase or decrease from generation to generation, so that extreme estimations can be found among the young and the old. In regard to many values, the positions of persons in middle and older adulthood are closer to each other, than to opinions of youth.

The change in values follows the changes in the economic and political situation in a country. Transformation is continuing and the process of transition is reflected in change of values, in the intensity and the direction of change. It is more apparent in Individualism/Collectivism than in the Materialism/Post-Materialism orientation. Value orientations – Individualism/Collectivism and Materialistic/Post-Materialistic – change with generations together with other, associated with them by theoretical considerations values.

Attitudes of the population towards democracy are very positive. The importance of freedom of expression is clearly underlined. It is much more valued than, influencing decisions, which is another Post-Materialistic value. The scarcity of participation poses serious threats to the development of democracy, however and it is neither highly valued nor practiced.

To summarize, the shift of value orientations in young adults is apparent. It is directed from Collectivism and to a lesser degree towards Post-Materialism and can be assumed to originate in the ongoing political and socio-economic process. The low level of trust to-

wards others, little readiness of the public to take responsibility for the development of the country, the low participation in voluntary organizations, all pose challenges to democratic transition. However considerable educational resources within the population and globalization, influencing society through access to information and social media, appear to compensate somewhat for the effects of economic austerity, and are helping to speed the establishment of favorable conditions for democratic development.

1. INTRODUCTION

An individual's values are principally defined by historical time, position in the life-cycle, and distinct characteristics of culture and personality. Drastic changes in the social, political and economic environment usually call into question existing values and promote their transformation.

The events of the past two decades in Georgia have drastically changed both the political and economic environments. Communism was replaced by Capitalism. The political orientation of Georgia towards Russia was replaced by an orientation towards the West. The breakdown of industry that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought extreme poverty to many. The new economic system made a small fraction of Georgia's population rich and created an unprecedented gap between the rich and the poor. Access to information through the internet and social media grew rapidly, crossing national boundaries and supporting the establishment of less traditional values.

All these changes initiated a process of value change. Thus, if this is so, it should be more evident among the young, the generation which was brought up in the changed environment.

Values usually capture the aspirations of individuals and societies. They generally refer to "what is desirable, deeply engrained standards that determine future directions and justify past actions" (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991, p.661). The concept of values is difficult to put into operation first of all because of the difficulties in capturing them in a single definition. For example all values do not fit the concept of being desirable, since many of them refer to existential and general beliefs about human beings, their relationship with each other and with the world. Moreover, values equally refer to real relationships as well as to the way a person thinks the world should be. Values can be either very general or very specific.

Milton Rokeach (1973) created an instrument which is considered as the first successful attempt at measuring values. He based his scale on the understanding of values as both individual and social phenom-

ena and defined them as “general beliefs that have motivational, not merely evaluative, but also prescriptive and proscriptive functions that guide actions and attitudes”. He made a distinction between instrumental values that serve the achievement of certain goals, and terminal values, that are valuable unto themselves. He also pointed to the hierarchical character of values, underlining the existence of central and more important, as well as less important values. He also developed the idea of ranking values.

Later, Shalom Schwartz (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) made an instrument to measure values, defining them as trans-situational goals that serve as a guiding principle in a person’s life. According to him values are based on the biological needs of an individual, on the requisites of coordinated social interaction, and on the survival and welfare needs of the group and therefore are applicable to any culture. Subsequently the instrument that measures values of twelve motivational domains is now widely used in cross-cultural studies.

As a result of his study of organizational culture in international corporations Geert Hofstede (1980) identified four “value dimensions” which are “the basic problems of humanity with which every society has to cope” (1980, p. 313). These dimensions are:

1. Power Distance (social inequality and the authority of one person over another);
2. Uncertainty Avoidance (the way societies deal with the uncertainty of the future);
3. Individualism versus Collectivism (the individual’s dependence on the group), and
4. Masculinity versus Femininity (the endorsement of masculine (e.g. assertive) goals as opposed to feminine (e.g. nurturing) goals within the group).

Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism dimension is reflected in the scale of Individualism-Collectivism (Triandis, et al., 1986).

At the level of a nation, Inglehart (1977) made the distinction between two dimensions of social values – Materialistic, which serve to satisfy economic and security needs, and Post-Materialistic that satisfy social and expressive needs. Once the Materialistic needs of a society are satisfied, it can move to another stage where Post-Materialistic values become prominent. Their emergence is linked with social and economic changes.

Values equally refer to individuals and societies. The authors of the measurement of values assume that understanding existing values in society is possible through the aggregation of the values expressed by individual members of the society (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991).

The acquisition of values begins in the early years of life through socialization. Values constitute the central core of the individual and are hierarchically organized so there are more important and more central values connected with many other values, and there are less central, less important ones.

Values can be discussed separately or in groups and are difficult to change and when changes occur, they are not rapid, especially those which are central and more important, and formed in early life. The difficulties encountered when changing central values are due to the fact that a change in the cognitive system requires an important effort, and that the negation of central beliefs creates uncertainty and anxiety. In cases of drastic change in the socio-economic environment, central values also change, but to a greater extent in the new generation than in older, already socialized individuals (Inglehart, 1997).

The study of the values of different generations is important in itself, as it increases understanding of motivational forces within different generations in a specific society and historical period. It also enhances knowledge on similarities and differences between generations and provides insights on the possible trajectory of a society's development (Inglehart, 1997).

For Georgia this is especially important in order to identify the challenges to democratic development. The studies and ratings of in-

ternational organizations in Georgia describe the country as a “hybrid regime”, and as partially free (Freedom in the World, 2011). Country ratings show deterioration on almost all indices of democracy during the last decade, and local experts agree on the deficiency of democracy in the country (Nodia, 2012).

2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

The aim of this study is to describe the values of different generations in Georgia and to assess intergenerational changes and to identify challenges to the democratic development of the country.

Among the existing measurements of values there are two value orientations: Individualism – Collectivism and Materialistic – Post-Materialistic, that have been selected for the study along with the values associated with them.

Additionally a number of other separate values such as health, education and religion have been assessed. Factors linked with values such as generalized trust, optimism, economic well-being, life satisfaction, self-esteem and others have been also studied.

Survey method was used for the study, carried out from November 21 to December 19, 2011 in all regions of Georgia. The representative study used proportional stratification where the number of respondents in each region corresponded to the proportion of that population within the country. Persons of three distinct generations were surveyed: aged 18-24, 40-50 and 60-70. The interviewers entered every fifth house from a designated starting place of the settlement, and surveyed persons according to the age and sex quota. Face-to-face interviews were carried out in Georgian and the length of interviews ranged from 30 to 45 minutes.

The number of respondents was 1058 (45.3 percent men and 54.7 percent women). The first age group of 18 to 24 made up 35 percent of the total, the second group 40 to 50 years old made up 40.1 percent and the third group, aged 60 to 70 made up 24.9 percent of the total.

Table 1: Distribution of respondents

	Total	Urban										Rural					
		18-24 olds		40-50 olds		60-70 olds		18-24 olds		40-50 olds		60-70 olds					
		M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W				
		%															
1	Tbilisi	275	26.0	47	62	30	44										
2	Achara	92	8.7	7	8	7	6	8	9	7	13	4	7				
3	Guria	34	3.1					6	6	6	8	4	4				
4	Racha- Lechkhu- mi	12	1.0					2	2	2	3	1	2				
5	Samegrelo - Zemo Svaneti	114	10.7	11	10	7	9	9	9	11	11	6	7				
6	Imereti	170	15.8	12	12	7	10	17	17	19	23	12	12				
7	Kakheti	98	9.1	8	6	4	4	9	11	11	12	6	9				
8	Mtsketa- Mtianeti	26	2.4					5	4	5	6	3	3				
9	Samtskhe- Javakheti	54	4.8	2	2	1	1	8	8	6	10	6	6				
10	Kvemo Kartli	107	11.4	9	8	0	6	12	13	6	16	6	12				
11	Shida Kartli	76	7.0	5	5	3	4	9	7	6	13	5	6				
	Total	1058	100	100	98	59	84	85	86	79	115	53	68				

The survey instrument contained 102 questions covering issues illustrating values, the economic condition of the respondents, relationships, democracy, equality, religious beliefs, as well as behaviors and personality characteristics. Apart from the designed specifically for the study questions, the research used a number of standard instruments – Individualism – Collectivism Scale, measure of Materialist and Post-Materialist values, list of features important for children and a number of questions used in multinational studies – generalized trust, optimism, life satisfaction, self-esteem and questions asked in the population survey “Barometer of Social Change” carried out by the Institute for Policy Studies (Sumbadze & Tarkhan-Mouravi, 2004; Sumbadze 2006, 2009, 2009a).

3. RESULTS OF THE STUDY

3.1. Individualism and Collectivism

3.1.1. *Brief Description*

Individualism –Collectivism is one of the most important value orientations, describing both society and an individual. It is increasingly used to explain cultural differences (Oyserman, Coon & Kimmelmeier, 2002).

Individualistic cultures assume that there is an abundance of individuals whose self-concept or the views they have on themselves are autonomous and less dependent on others. Collectivistic cultures assume that people are more dependent on their roles and belonging to groups. Thus two types of self-concepts are discussed, “independent self-concept” characterizing Individualistic culture and perceived as being stable and separated, and “interdependent Self-Concept” characterizing Collectivistic culture and determined by the group membership, (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Members of the Collectivistic culture view groups as being more viable than members of Individualistic culture, who ascribe more agency to the individual. Thus members of an Individualistic culture use more primary control mechanisms while those of Collectivistic culture use more secondary control mechanisms. This means that for problem solving, members of Individualistic culture put their effort on changing the source of the problem, while members of Collectivistic culture concentrate their efforts on changing their attitude to the problem. Members of Collectivistic culture are more likely to adapt their behavior to the goals of the group they belong to, or wish to belong to.

The two opposing motivational factors, one of belonging, perceiving oneself as the member of a big group – and the other of separation, perceiving oneself as a separate entity – are present in every in-

dividual. The difference is in the proportion expressed. In members of Collectivistic culture the motivation to belong is more visible, while members of Individualistic culture are more likely to be motivated by individual behavior and separation from the group to reinforce their own uniqueness. Persons with an independent self-concept form and dissolve relationships more easily, while the relationships of those with an interdependent self-concept, i.e. members of Collectivistic culture are of a more stable character (Heine, 2010).

Members of Collectivistic culture pay a lot of attention to their in – group, often perceived as the unity of persons with a common fate. In pre-historic times group membership was a precondition of survival, as it determined the possibility of obtaining food and security. With the development of culture the importance shifted first to the tribe and historically evolved into an accent on work group and nation. The boundary between in-group and out-group is more distinct in Collectivistic culture. The in-group is perceived as more homogeneous. However attitudes towards members of in – and out – groups are more similar in an Individualistic culture. When there is a conflict between group goals and individual goals, Individualistic culture gives preference to the individual while the inverse is true for Collectivistic culture.

Norms serve as regulatory mechanisms in Collectivistic cultures, while personal attitudes serve this function in Individualistic culture. Hierarchy as well as harmony and saving face by not revealing problems to outsiders are norms in Collectivistic culture. Also, the achievements of the in-group and relationships between group members are priorities in Collectivistic culture. For Individualistic cultures personal destiny, achievements and independence from the group take priority.

The understanding of in-group is also different in the two cultures. The notion is much more narrow in Individualistic culture, referring only to close kin and one or two friends. In case of conflict preference in Collectivistic culture is given to vertical or hierarchical relationship (e.g. parent-child relationship in the family context), rather than hori-

zontal ones (e.g. spouses in the family context) as is true to Individualistic culture.

There is more group diversity in Individualistic cultures with a greater choice of membership. People are members of more groups and more frequently leave the groups, join other groups or create new groups. Since members of Individualistic cultures are often members of many groups, they have good skills for maintaining superficial, but not close relationships (Triandis, 1990), with a tendency to less difference in emotional distance towards in – and out – group members.

For Collectivistic cultures closeness to friends is pronounced, with less closeness to out-group members. Achievement, pleasure and competition are important in Individualistic societies while Collectivistic culture values family integrity, security and conformism. Consequently, when children are brought up in Individualistic culture, more attention is paid to autonomy, creativity and self-reliance, while in Collectivistic culture children are taught obedience, duty and readiness to sacrifice their own goals to the group.

The economic and social development of a country contributes to the shift from Collectivistic to Individualistic culture (Hofstede, 1980). Affluence increases financial independence and diminishes dependence on the group. Affluence is also linked to smaller household size, such as single-child families, which in its turn contributes to an Individualistic cultural orientation. The increased exposure to media supports development of Individualistic values, as most films are produced in Individualistic cultures and reflect their values. Also important is mobility, both social and geographical. Those of a higher social-economic class have a more individualistic cultural orientation, migration from rural to urban areas as well as temporary migration to economically more developed countries contributes to a shift to individualism.

Collectivism may have different profile in different countries.

3.1.2. Individualism – Collectivism Orientation s and Corresponding Values

The scale used in the survey ((Triandis, et al., 1986) has been constructed to study Individualism – Collectivism across cultures and sub-cultures as well as among individuals. The authors of the scale do not regard Individualism – Collectivism as the poles of one dimension, but rather consider it as a two-dimensional construct. The instrument contains four subscales, which include self-reliance and separation from in-group as measures of Individualism and interdependence and family integrity as measures of Collectivism (Triandis., Cusker., & Hui, 1990). According to the authors, on a cultural level Collectivism is the best reflected in the family integrity subscale, and Individualism is best reflected in the separation from in-group subscale.


The results of our study clearly pointed to intergenerational differences in Georgia concerning Collectivism. The mean score of Collectivism increases with age. Our data confirmed the two dimensional character of the scale showing, that the increase in Collectivism with the age is not accompanied by a decrease in the mean score on the self-reliance sub-scale of Individualism. As for another sub-scale measuring Individualism – separation from the in-group the difference among generations is not significant. Results unequivocally point to the decrease of a Collectivistic orientation among youth, while the data don't permit as clear an interpretation concerning Individualism.

The low score on self-reliance could be reflecting the cultural characteristics of Georgian families with the tendency to prolonged infantilism thus could be associated more to the age than to the generation. The lack of previous experience with the scale does not allow us to make more definite conclusions.

Table 2. Mean scores of Individualism-Collectivism subscales across generations


Sub-scale	18-24 olds	40-50 olds	60-70 olds	Total	Difference
	N=370	N=424	N=264	N=1058	
Self-reliance <i>M</i> <i>SD</i>	7.10 2.10	7.23 2.10	7.67 2.09	7.30 2.11	Chi-Square 5.99; df 2; P<.005
Family integrity <i>M</i> <i>SD</i>	1.49 .67	1.75 .52	1.87 .36	1.69 .57	Chi-Square 41.8; df 2; P<.001
Interdependence <i>M</i> <i>SD</i>	3.19 1.16	3.46 1.16	3.77 .99	3.44 1.14	Chi-Square 21.17; df; P<.001
Separation from in-group <i>M</i> <i>SD</i>	1.09 1.08	.98 1.08	.94 1.06	1.01 1.07	n.s.

The mean score of Collectivism was calculated by adding the data of the subscales for family integrity and interdependence. For analytical purposes respondents have been grouped by scale values as having low (with scores from 0 to 6) and high (scores 6 and 7) Collectivism scores. Results again demonstrate significant intergenerational differences, with a linear increase of Collectivism with age (Chi-Square 44.90; df 2; p<.001). This allows us to discuss the differences linked with Collectivism issues as being differences between generations, despite the fact that within each generation a certain part of respondents shows an opposing tendency. For example, 32.7 percent of youth score high on Collectivism and 40.9 percent of older adults score low on Collectivism.



Graph 1. *The share of low scores on Collectivism among generations*


As discussed above, a number of values are associated with the Individualism – Collectivism orientations. Taking all respondents together, integrity towards friends, enjoying respect and helping others are considered as the most desirable personality features. Collectivistic orientation as discussed above puts emphasis on the importance of such qualities as traditionalism, being liked and being humble.



Graph 2. *Ranking of desirable personality features*

With age and hence with Collectivism, the importance of the following increases: following traditions, acting according the rules, being humble, and enjoying respect, while the following decrease: the importance of having a good time, taking risks, having new ideas and being creative. Intergenerational differences were not found for such qualities as integrity to friends, being successful, believing in God, and helping others.

With Collectivism and Individualism are associated features that the child should learn at home. Respondents ascribe the highest values to such characteristics as a sense of responsibility, hard work, determination and perseverance. Youth and consequently people with a low Collectivism score, consider it important for a child to learn qualities at home that are associated with independence and success. E.g. Most youth consider independence, determination and perseverance as important, while senior respondents consider obedience much more important.



Graph 3. Ranking of desired qualities for children

From the definition, Collectivism is tightly linked with the importance of family. The overwhelming majority (88.7 percent) express support to the family as an institution, although a small fraction (5.9 percent) thinks that marriage is outdated. More youth (9.5 percent), than persons in middle adulthood (4.0 percent) or senior (1.9 percent) respondents were unable to answer the question (*Chi Square* 22.87; *df*:4; *p*<.001).

The study shows that older adults ascribe more importance to family cohesion. Among older adults the share is higher for those who think that the family should have dinner together on a daily bases (63.8 percent in the first, 73.6 percent in the second and 84.5 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 35.37; *df*:4; $p < .001$); that the family should celebrate together such festivities as New Year, Christmas, birthday (88.8 percent in the first, 95.3 percent in the second and 96.2 percent in the third age group , *Chi Square* 20.74; *df*:4; $p < .001$). However, the desire to celebrate with the family does not seem to always be realized- as one third (30.3 percent) of the respondents pointed out they have not celebrated any of the 10 listed festivities with the family for the last 3 months. Of those who did celebrate in the last three months, 39.2 percent celebrated one, 23.3 percent two, 4.8 percent three and 2.4 percent from four to six festivities. Own birthday (45.7 percent), religious festival (40.4 percent) and child's birthday (5.2 percent) were the most often cited.

The overwhelming majority thinks that a person has to put aside everything to help a family member in need; 52.2 percent considers that one has to defend the position of the family even knowing that it is not right. On these issues generations do not differ, but they differ in their attitudes towards upbringing. The young generation grants more freedom to the child (*Chi-Square* 41.64; *df* 4; $p < .001$) and thinks that she or he should have the right to argue with his or her parents. Such is the opinion of 33.8 percent of youth, 26.9 percent of middle-aged and 14.4 percent of older adults. Similarly smaller is the share among the young adults (60.5 percent) of those who agree with the statement that "mother knows best what is good for her child", compared to persons of middle adulthood (65.6 percent) and of older adults (76.4 percent, *Chi-Square* 48.89; *df* 4; $p < .001$).

Main results

- The study showed the differences among generations in Individualism – Collectivism value orientation. The Collectiv-

istic orientation increases with the age, but is not followed by a decrease of Individualistic orientation. Older adults have higher scores on one of the two Individualistic sub-scales, namely on self-reliance, which could be attributed to the joint effect of age and culture – in Georgia independence from the family is gained in more older age than in the West. It could also be the effect of transitional condition in the shift from Collectivism to Individualism.

- Intergenerational difference is obvious in other values associated with Individualism – Collectivism orientation. Favoring traditionalism, family coherence and bringing up children to be obedient are much more valued by older adults, while the young generations value independence and determination more.

3.2. Materialistic and Post-Materialistic Value Orientation and Other Values Connected to It

3.2.1. Brief Description

The Materialistic and Post-Materialistic value orientation is often used for comparing countries and generations. According to the Modernization theory, on which is based to a large extent Materialistic and Post-Materialistic value orientation concept (Inglehart, 1997), modernization supports the increase of economic efficiency, development of economics, bureaucracy and science. Post – Modernization although not negating these values – prioritizes self-expression, freedom of choice and individual well-being. A high level of urbanization, industrialization, specialization, use of scientific achievements, bureaucracy, obedience to the law, social mobility, higher levels of education, material well-being and decrease of gender-based roles all characterize post-modern society.

In post-modern society the role of family decreases. If in early historical periods the family was the necessary condition for survival,

in the post-modern world the state ensures security by providing pensions, health care, care for the elderly, support to children without parental care, etc, thus the functional importance of the family and the strictness of norms associated with it diminish. Women gain more opportunities to work outside home.

Underlying the Post-modern worldview are autonomy and diversity, which reflect a decline in the importance of hierarchical institutions and rigid norms, and an increase in individual choice and participation.

Modernization is not necessarily followed by democratization, however, and dictatorship also can be its consequence, which has been proven many times (e.g. communism).

However the prevalence of Post-Materialistic values makes the emergence and effectiveness of democracy almost inevitable. Economic development and physical security support democracy, tolerance for ambiguity and cultural change.

Free expression and participation become goods in and of themselves and not a means for economic achievement. Values associated with employment shift from maximizing one's income and job security to insistence on interesting and meaningful work.

Real democracy implies governance by the people, when public policy is determined by the priorities of the masses. This distinguishes an "electorate democracy", which can be found in many autocratic and "hybrid regimes", from a "liberal democracy" (Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). Countries where the value of self-expression is high are characterized by a participatory orientation towards social and political life; gender equality; tolerance towards foreigners, homosexuals and other out-groups; and a high level of generalized trust. Next to self-expression, the efficiency of democracy is determined by the abundance of resources available to carry out actions, which entail both economic resources and education, well – organized masses and their readiness for self-expression.

When the masses require democracy, this forces the political elite to behave democratically and make democracy function.

According to Iglehart (1997) the results of surveys point to the causal relationship of self-expression to democracy. Self-expression is conducive to democracy, and not vice versa. Democracy does not ensure an increase in the importance of self-expression. An increase in material means, cognitive skills and social connections widens the arena for self-expression. Thus it can be concluded that the value of self-expression is a synthesis of generalized trust, tolerance and political activism and it plays a decisive role in emergence and functioning of democracy.


Review of the data of the World Value Survey over several years reveals that the value of self-expression emerges during generational change. Value formation begins early in childhood and is finished already at the onset of adulthood, but life experiences continue to shape values during the whole life cycle, albeit at a much slower rate and in much milder form.

3.2.2. Materialistic and Post-Materialistic Values, and the Values and Personality Features Associated with Them

As per to the standard procedure for measuring Materialistic and Post-Materialistic values, respondents were requested to make a choice twice to select their preferred ones from four values. These four values comprised two Materialistic values: “Maintaining order in the country” and “Fighting rising prices”, and two Post-Materialistic values: “Giving people more say in government decisions” and “Protecting freedom of speech”.

Most frequently selected was “Maintaining order in the country” followed by “Protecting freedom of speech” which showed that the majority (56.7 percent) favored a mixed value orientation, followed by Materialistic (31.7 percent) values. Post – Materialistic values were selected by 11.6 percent. Generations differ in their choices (*Chi Square* 32.20; *df*.4; *p*<.001). The importance of mixed and post-materialistic

values is higher among youth, while materialistic orientation is prevalent in the older generation.



Graph 4. *Materialistic and Post-Materialistic values according to generation*

3.2.3. Democracy

Materialistic and Post-Materialistic values are often discussed in connection with democracy. According to Welzel and Inglehart (2008), in the countries where the value of self-expression is high, such indicators of democracy as political activism, gender equality, tolerance to the out-group and generalized trust are also high.

Survey data show that for all three generations studied, democracy and its main characteristics such as participation, freedom of expression, equality before the law, are important. 71.1 percent of respondents consider democracy to be the best form of governance. Political and public activity is considered desirable, as the majority (53.0

percent) think that solving the problems facing the country is possible only through active participation by the population. More representatives of older generation (59.7 percent) think this way than those representing middle-age (50.9 percent) and young (50.7 percent) adulthood (*Chi Square* 11.63; *df*.4; *p*<.05).

75.0 percent think that the President of the country should listen to people and act according to their demands. A bigger proportion (45.4 percent) does not agree with the statement that people's participation is not needed while making important decisions, if decision power is in the hands of trustworthy and knowledgeable leaders.

A lack of interest towards politics expressed by youth does not fit in with the acknowledgement of the importance of participation by the majority of respondents. Only one-fourth (25.1 percent) of the young adults express their interest in politics. The interest increases with age so that 39.4 percent of people in middle-age and 53.9 in older adulthood are interested in politics. The same regularity is reflected in answers about watching TV news (31.1 percent of youth, 54.2 percent of middle-aged and 71.9 percent of older respondents) and talking politics with friends (13.4 percent of youth, 26.0 percent of middle-aged and 29.4 percent of older respondents).

All three generations agree that it is necessary to have the possibility for self-expression. 72.2 percent think that democracy is impossible without opposition. A bigger share (48.5 percent) thinks that any person or organization should be able to organize protests against any government initiative and that everyone, notwithstanding her beliefs, should be able to express her position (87.0 percent) and enjoy the same legal rights as anyone else (87.4 percent).

Equality before the law is considered by 89.5 percent as a necessary condition for democracy, although 48.8 percent think that authorities can sometimes violate the law to detain criminals. A majority supports the idea that leaders must be held responsible and accountable. 77.4 percent do not agree with the statement that the main thing for a politician is to achieve his goals, and by any means possible.

The Situation in Georgia

Despite the declarations about building democracy, international indices show a gradual decrease of the level of democracy in Georgia.

Table3. Freedom House Democracy Index for 2002-2011

Index	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Electoral Process	5.00	5.25	5.25	4.75	4.75	4.50	4.75	5.25	5.25	5.00
Civil Society	4.00	4.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.75	3.75	3.75
Independent Media	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25
National Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.00	5.75	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50
Local Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.00	5.75	5.50	5.5	5.50	5.50	5.50
Judicial Framework and Independence	4.25	4.50	4.50	5.00	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	5.00
Corruption	5.50	5.75	6.00	5.75	5.50	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.75
Democracy Score	4.58	4.83	4.83	4.96	4.86	4.68	4.79	4.93	4.93	4.86

Scale values: 1 the highest and 7 the lowest level of democracy

Source: Freedom in the World , 2011.


The largest group of respondents (35.8 percent) thinks that there is no democracy in Georgia, 31.1 percent are of the opposite opinion, and 33.0 percent are undecided. The majority are negative about the possibility for realizing democratic values, as 69.4 percent think ordinary citizens cannot exert influence on government decisions. The

share of those who think ordinary citizens can have an impact increases with age (64.9 percent in the first, 69.0 in the second and 76.3 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 17.13; *df*:4; *p*<.005).

According to 48.6 percent of respondents, authorities ignore people's opinions and 57.2 per cent believe citizens of the country are not equal before the law, while 48.2 percent say human rights are not observed.

Almost half of those surveyed (47.9 percent) think that Georgia is on the right path to development, 19.7 percent think not and many (32.4 percent) are undecided.

Trust in institutions is low with little difference between generations. The Georgian Orthodox Church receives the biggest trust (86.6 percent) and for state institutions the most trusted is the police (51.5 percent) and the least trusted is Parliament (28.7 percent).



Graph 5. *Trust to institutions*

Equality and Tolerance

Democracy is based on equality. It entails many spheres – gender relations, economics and relationships with ethnic, religious and sexual minorities. Gender equality in both the private and public spheres is supported more by the young generation. More older adults think the decisions in the family should be made according to men's wishes (61.9 percent of the first, 65.6 percent of the second and 77.5 percent of the third age group, *Chi Square* 18.46; *df*:4; $p < .005$). The older generation adheres more to the idea that women should spend less time working outside the home, to look after the family (40.5 percent in the first, 44.7 percent in the second and 68.2 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 53.03; *df*:4; $p < .001$). They believe it is better for everyone when a man works and a woman looks after the family (42.3 percent in the first, 53.6 percent in the second and 74.0 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 63.38; *df*:4; $p < .001$).

Fewer youth believe that in case of job scarcity a man should have preference over a woman to be hired (29.1 percent in the first, 34.1 percent in the second and 44.7 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 19.35; *df*:6; $p < .005$), or that a University education is more important for boys than for girls (16.9 percent in the first, 22.7 percent in the second and 31.2 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 17.76; *df*:2; $p < .001$).

All generations agree (86.1 percent) that women should be more actively involved in public life. The majority (73.4 percent) believe it is better to have a boy if the couple has one child. The situation regarding gender equality in Georgia is more critically estimated by youth. Fewer youth than older respondents think men and women are equal in Georgia (39.8 percent in the first, 48.6 percent in the second and 47.0 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 19.35; *df*:6; $p < .005$), but older adults are more convinced that even when genders are equally qualified, it is still easier for men to find a well-paid job (38.2 percent in the first, 35.7 percent in the second and 48.5 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 25.81; *df*:4; $p < .001$).


Economic equality seems to be less attractive to youth. With age the share of those who believe that everyone should have about the same income increases (62.9 percent of representatives of young, 70.1 percent of middle and 72.3 percent of older adults, *Chi Square* 15.07; *df*.4; $p < .005$).

Young people are more tolerant towards certain out-groups – ethnic and sexual minorities, drug addicts, criminals, etc. but less tolerant towards religious minorities.

More older adults support the idea that in case of job scarcity ethnic Georgians should be privileged (47.2 percent in the first, 55.6 percent in the second and 61.4 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 16.64; *df*.4; $p < .005$).

Although low percentages appear for all groups on the questions of homosexual persons having the right to live as they like, more youth share that view (14.4 percent in the first, 8.1 percent in the second and 7.2 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 35.56; *df*.4; $p < .001$).

In answering the question on the desirability to have representatives of certain groups as neighbors, homosexual persons were named as the least desirable, followed by drug addicts and persons with mental problems. Intolerance towards all the listed groups, except persons with mental problems, increases with age.




Graph 6. Lack of desire to have members of different out-groups as neighbors

Social Action and Belief in the Possibility to Achieve

Democracy should provide a person with the possibility for social and political activity, and achievement should be based on effort, skills, knowledge and equality before the law. Most of those surveyed believe that hard work eventually brings success (81.9 percent) and what a person achieves depends more on her than on others or the situation (71.7 percent). There are generational differences in the degree of adherence to the last statement however (*Chi Square* 15.20; *df*.2; $p < .005$). It is more shared by the young (77.1 percent) than by persons in middle (65.2 percent) and older adulthood (74.5 percent). The opposite tendency shows up in the estimation of the importance of education for achieving success. Education is estimated as important by 59.3 percent of the youngest group, 73.0 percent of persons in middle age and 77.9 percent of persons in older adulthood.

Very few of the respondents are active in public affairs. Only 3.4 percent noted they were members of voluntary organizations. However in regard to social activities 76.6 percent have provided some kind of assistance to non-family member during past three months; 25.0 provided assistance once, 19.1 percent twice and 13.0 percent three times, while 18.5 percent helped non-family members from four to nine times —most often financially.



Graph 7. Assistance

It is not at all surprising that youth have more active social life than older adults, except for attending rituals linked with death (funerals, 40-day memorial services, etc). Youth more frequently visit cafes and restaurants, attend birthday and other parties, go to concerts, sports events, cinema and theatre. Older adults more frequently attend

funerals, while persons in middle age most often attend weddings and baptisms.

Table 4. Social activities of people of different generations

	Event	18-24 olds	40-50 olds	60-70 olds	Total	DifferenceChi-Square; df; p<.
1	Funeral/40 – day memorial etc	44.8	66.0	64.0	58.1	41.0;2;.001
2	Birthday party	73.6	58.3	33.0	57.3	1.03;2;.001
3	Café/restaurants	67.8	36.6	11.2	41.3	2.06;2;.001
4	Wedding	29.4	30.0	19.2	27.1	11.09;2;.005
5	Party	27.5	25.0	16.1	23.7	11.7;2;.005
6	Concert	19.7	9.0	5.7	11.9	34.02;2;.001
7	Sports event	17.7	8.5	5.0	10.8	29.62;2;.001
8	Baptism	12.0	12.3	3.8	10.1	14.96;2;.005
9	Cinema	16.9	4.2	4.6	8.7	46.9;2;.001
10	Theatre	13.6	6.1	5.4	8.6	18.6;2;.001
11	Museum/exhibition	10.1	8.3	5.7	8.3	n.s.

3.2.4. Trust and Honesty

The effective functioning of society largely depends on mutual trust and the solidarity of its members. General trust towards others is considered as a pre-condition for democracy and social activity. Trust is defined as a “generalized expectancy that other people are generally reliable and honest” (Jones., Couch., & Scott, 1997).

Generalized trust proved to be very low across all three generations. Only 20.6 percent of respondents think that most people can be trusted, while 79.4 percent believe that one needs to be very careful in dealing with people.

Tolerance of unjustifiable actions is linked with trust. Youth proved to be more tolerant than the older respondents. The only exception was the case with abortion – it is less acceptable to the young. This is perhaps linked to the higher rate of religious belief among youth.

The physical abuse of one’s wife is the least acceptable behavior – justified by only 0.5 percent, followed by the physical abuse of children and homosexuality.


Table 5. Ranking of unjustifiable behavior

Rank	Behavior	18-24 olds	40-50 olds	60-70 olds	Total	Difference
		N=369	N=424	N=261	N=1054	Chi-Square; dfl; <.
1	For a man to beat his wife	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	n.s.
2	Parents beating a child	4.7	1.2	1.5	2.6	n.s.
3	Homo-sexuality	6.8	1.9	1.2	3.5	39.19;8;<.001
4	Marijuana use	7.6	3.6	1.6	4.5	45.56;8;<.001
5	Prostitution	8.9	2.4	1.9	4.6	43.53;8;<.001
6	Adultery by woman	6.7	5.5	1.9	5.0	21.31;8;<.05
7	Abortion	3.0	6.4	6.2	5.2	18.48;8;<.05
8	Violation of traffic laws	11.7	4.7	1.9	6.5	44.17;8;<.001
9	Buying stolen goods	55.0	3.8	2.3	7.2	82.84;8;<.001
10	Crossing the street in at unauthorized places	14.6	6.6	5.0	9.0	37.02;8;<.001
11	Avoiding a fare on public transport	16.3	8.4	4.2	10.1	50.48;8;<.001

12	Lying for achieving own goals	18.1	9.5	5.8	11.5	48.3;8;<.001
13	Adultery by man	18.1	10.9	6.5	12.3	27.62;8;<.001
14	Witnessing against a friend when it is done for establishing the truth	15.9	16.7	21.3	17.5	ar aris mniS-vnelovani
15	Cheating at exams	33.0	18.0	20.0	22.8	52.62;8;<.001
16	Divorcing	32.2	21.3	20.8	25.0	35.04;8;<.001
17	Telling a lie for a friend's sake	41.3	24.9	19.8	29.3	52.66;8;<.001

3.2.5. Education, Economic Well-being and Satisfaction with Life

Education and economic well-being are considered resources for social change. 75.1 percent of respondents have more than a secondary school education. The number of computer users is also high. More than a half (58.4 percent) use computers, 55.5 percent use internet, 45.9 percent use social networks. The use of computers, internet and social networks sharply decreases with age. The difference is particularly important between the respondents of the second and third age groups.



Graph 8. Computer users across generations


Economic well-being facilitates the transition of a society from Modernist to Post-Modernist. Perceived well-being is more important than objective well-being, though it is obviously determined to a great extent by economic reality. Young adults perceive the economic condition of their families more favorably than older adults. Taking all responses together to describe the economic condition of the family, the following statement was chosen most often: “We have enough money for food and clothes, but cannot afford to buy more durable goods”. The statement was most often selected by the respondents of the second and the third age groups, while youth most often selected the following statement: “We can afford durable purchases and holidays but cannot easily afford really expensive things like a car, an apartment/ house etc.” (42.9 percent in the first, 29.6 percent in the second and 19.5 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 95.93; *df*:8; $p < .001$).

It is difficult to believe that intergenerational perceptions reflect factual reality, thus it is more likely that the difference in perception shows that youth are more optimistic and evaluate the economic well-

being of their families more favorably. The youth also estimated the economic changes during past year more favorably: 36.3 percent in the first, 22.0 percent in the second and 13.7 percent in the third age group pointed that conditions had improved (*Chi Square* 61.62; *df*.4; *p*<.001).


The optimism regarding economic prospects is high across generations, although, again, a more important share of youth (69.9 percent) expect improvements within the next year, compared to persons in middle (53.4 percent) and older (40.5 percent) categories (*Chi Square* 68.54; *df*.4; *p*<.001).

The 40-50 year-olds are more economically active (64.3 percent) than either 18-24 years olds (38.4 percent) or older adults (36.4 percent, *Chi Square* 73.03; *df*.2; *p*<.001). However, almost half of the respondents pointed out that they did not have any income during the past three months. Business activity, including realization of own agricultural produce, comprises the source of a more than half of those surveyed. Younger people are more involved in private business and older ones are more dependent on sources from the government.



Graph 9. Sources of income

Generations do not differ in their attitudes towards the importance of work. Majority considers income as the most important aspect of work..



Graph 10. *Importance of work aspects*

Main results:


- The majority of respondents adhere to mixed values, selecting most often one Materialistic value: “Maintaining order in the country” and one Post-Materialistic “Protecting freedom of speech“. Mixed and Post-Materialistic values are seen more often among younger generations.
- Attitudes towards democracy as a form of governance and its components like participation in decision making, freedom of expression and equality before the law are universally favored.

- Gender equality and tolerance towards minorities is highest among youth. The only exception is the attitude towards other religions, which is the lowest for the younger generation.
- Generalized trust, membership in voluntary organizations and value of having impact on decisions, which are considered as preconditions of democracy are very low in all generations.
- Education, which is a resource for democratic development is quite high. Half of respondents are computer users and their share is especially high among youth.
- Young people estimate the economic condition of their families more favorably than older ones and show more economic optimism. The income of youth depends more on the private sector, and that of older adults on state sector.

3.3. Religion


A large majority of respondents belong to the Georgian Orthodox Church with 2.4 percent Muslim, 1.7 percent Catholic, 0.6 percent Armenian Gregorian, 0.6 percent Jehovah Witnesses, 0.3 percent belong to other denominations and 1.0 percent are atheists.

Tolerance to other than Georgian orthodox denomination is low. Only 23.7 percent think that other religions should have the same rights as the Georgian Orthodox church (21.4 percent in the first, 20.8 percent in the second and 31.4 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 18.08; *df*.4; *p*<.001). All generations demonstrate more readiness to permit religious activities to followers of the main religions.



Graph 11. *Granting right to perform religious rituals*

The intolerance to other denominations is not surprising, considering that the majority (56.3 percent) believes in the existence of the only one true religion, and generations do not differ in this conviction.



Graph 12. Religious belief

The survey data demonstrated a high importance of religion, especially for youth. For the majority of the respondents (65.9 percent) Christianity rather than nationality composes the basis of their identity.

The importance of religion diminishes with the age. It is estimated as the most important by 55.3 percent of respondents in the first, 44.8 percent in the second and 41.3 percent in the third age group (*Chi Square* 24.09; *df*:6; *p*<.001). Little difference is found in the observance of the main religious rituals which are observed by 37.0 percent.


Young people attend church more frequently – from one or three times a month to several times a week (67.1 percent). Older generations attend at a rate of 53,2 percent in the second and 42. 1 percent in the third age group (*Chi Square* 63.98; *df*:10; *p*<.001).

Almost half of the youth (49.7 percent) are members of a congregation compared to 38.7 percent of persons in the second and 27.2 percent in the third age group (*Chi Square*35.75; *df*.2; *p*<.001).

A large majority believe in God (96.7 percent) and the existence of sin (83.0 percent). Intergenerational differences are found in extent of beliefs about: the existence of heaven (74.2 percent in the first, 65.1 percent in the second and 50.0 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 46.33; *df*.4; *p*<.001); the existence of hell (66.9 percent in the first, 58.3 percent in the second and 42.3 percent in the third age group, *Chi Square* 48.12; *df*.4; *p*<.001); life after death (61.2 percent in the first, 55.1 percent in the second and 43.3 percent in the third age groups, *Chi Square* 63.98; *df*.4; *p*<.001).

Most respondents (80.7 percent) find relief and strength in religion. It gives relief to the biggest share of 40-50 year-olds (83.5 percent) than to the young (80.8 percent) and older adults (76.1 percent) (*Chi Square* 9.12; *df*.4; <.001).

Most respondents believe that the Georgian Orthodox Church responds to the spiritual needs of an individual and has answers for moral, family and social problems.



Graph 13. Church responses to problems

Most respondents support the unity of religious and secular spheres. About half (49.4 percent) considers that politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office and 53.1 percent do not agree that religious leaders should not try to influence government decisions.

Main Results:

- Religion is more important for youth than the other age groups. Young people more than older adults base their identity on religion.
- Religion comprises an area for social activities more for young than older adults, more of them being members of a congregation.
- Compared to older adults, young people demonstrate lower tolerance towards other denominations.

3.4. Other Values and Estimations of Well-being

Respondents ascribe the highest value to health, then to family and home. In the estimation of these values and the value of money generations do not differ. However young people ascribe more value to leisure, friends, religion, work and education, while older adults value politics and public life more.

Table 6. Estimation of values by generations

Rank	Value	18-24 olds	40-50 olds	60-70 olds	Total	Difference
		N=370	N=424	N=262	N=1056	<i>Chi-Square, df, p<.</i>
1	Health	98.9	97.4	97.3	97.9	n.s.
2	Family	98.4	96.9	95.5	97.1	n.s.
3	Home	92.1	94.6	93.9	93.6	n.s.
4	Education	94.1	91.3	87.4	91.3	11.11;4;025
5	Money	85.7	89.4	90.9	88.5	n.s.
6	Work	93.0	88.2	80.6	88.6	31.76;4;001
7	Religion	88.1	84.7	84.1	85.7	9.50;4;050
8	Friends	96.2	83.0	73.8	85.3	65.50;4;001
9	Leisure	63.8	49.3	43.2	52.8	35.46;4;001
10	Politics and public life	20.9	34.2	37.1	30.3	28.82;4;001

Young people demonstrate more life-satisfaction. Half of respondents are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with life. The feeling of satisfaction is higher among youth (43.8 percent), than a persons in the middle (34.0 percent) or late (35.2 percent) adulthood (*Chi Square* 12.33; *df*.4; *p*<.05). The same regularity is revealed in regard to happiness. Most young people (65.6 percent) consider themselves happy, and this diminishes with age (56.1 percent among the second and 46.8 percent of the third age group, *Chi Square* 24.80; *df*.4; *p*<.001). Young

people are also more self-confident (66.9 percent) compared to persons in the second (54.5 percent) and in the third (54.8 percent, (*Chi Square* 18.02; *df* 4; $p < .005$) age groups and have a more optimistic outlook (75.2 percent in the first, 53.6 percent in the second and 45.9 percent in the third age group, *Chi-Square* 63.19; *df* 2; $p < .001$).

Main Results:

- Health, family and home comprise core values.
- Young people value leisure, friends, religion, work and education, more than older adults while older adults value politics and public life more than youth.
- Compared to older adults, young people express more life satisfaction, reveal more self-confidence and happiness, and have a more optimistic outlook.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The main goal of the study was to describe intergenerational differences in values and based on the results to identify main challenges for the democratic development of the country.

Results unequivocally demonstrated intergenerational differences although to a different extent for the majority of the values studied. Three generations – youth, parents and grandparents – were studied. The youngest generation, 18-24 were born in 1986-1993 and spent almost all their life in an independent Georgia. Their parents – 40-50 years old – as well as their grandparents, 60-70 years old were born after World War II, in 1962-1971 and 1941-1951 respectively and both generations reached adulthood during the Communist rule. The main difference between them is in the Length of life experience during Communist rule.

With the onset of deterioration of the economic situation, the generation of parents was 20-30 years old and the grandparents 40-50 years old. Therefore it can be assumed that for the generation of grandparents it should have been more difficult to adjust to new political and economic conditions that began in the 1990s, and that the experience will probably have influenced their values to a lesser degree. The study showed this assumption to be correct.

Intergenerational difference most often is linear – estimations increase or decrease from generation to generation, so that the extreme estimations can be found among the young and the old. In regard to a great number of values, the positions of persons in middle and older adulthood are closer than to opinions of younger adults.

The change in values follows the change in the economic and political situation in the country. These changes are ongoing and the process of transition is reflected in the change of values and the direction they take. The extent of change is not the same for all values. It is more apparent in Individualism/Collectivism than in the Materialism/Post-Materialism orientation. The Collectivistic orientation is shared less by

youth than by older generations. The bigger is the share of those adhering to mixed or Post-Materialistic values among the youth.

Value orientations – Individualism/Collectivism and Materialistic/Post-Materialistic change with generations along with other values related to theoretical considerations. E.g. the shift observed in youth from Collectivism is accompanied by a decrease in importance of family coherence and traditionalism, while the shift towards Post-Materialism is reflected in an increase of gender equality and tolerance towards minorities.

Attitudes of the population towards democracy are very positive. The importance of freedom of expression is clearly underlined and is much higher than that of influencing decisions, another Post-Materialistic value.

Protest actions also point to the importance of this value. Examples of rapid mobilization of the population at key moments have been related to restrictions on media freedom (e.g. action at TV station Rustavi-2 in 2003).

The lack of participation poses a serious threat to the development of democracy, however. It is neither highly valued nor practiced. Participation has a specific character in Georgia. It cannot be claimed that the population as a whole is an impartial observer of events, however. From time to time it actively gets involved in protest actions, but the general tendency is to entrust certain political actors with the responsibility to act, and then wait for them to act in their stead. Sometime later this is usually followed by a polarization between government antagonists, with the slogan “leave office” and government supporters acting under the slogan “Give them time”. The population fails to understand that sharing the power with the public is not in the interest of any political elite, and that this should be the people’s constant concern. Such an understanding of democracy has not yet developed in Georgia. Before 2012 parliamentary elections the old model is still there – the association of new hopes with new political forces and then waiting for these political groups to build democracy.

Fortunately small changes are occurring, illustrated by student protests against the lack of textbooks in Georgian or the fight for a decrease in tuition fees, protest actions of journalists against detention of photojournalists or resigning of 60 employees of National Exam Center in solidarity for firing its director.

An important intergenerational difference in attitude towards religion is apparent, religion being more important for youth. People who now are in their middle and older adulthood grew in a time when religion was almost unnoticeable and the state was strong. We can in part agree with the opinion, that religious activity now is mainly a reaction to the past (Ratiani, 2006), although there should be another, more potent reason. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was accompanied by chaos and the deterioration of the economic situation. It created the necessity to reappraise core values and beliefs. In such cases the search for a strong and benevolent authority is usual. The Church has been such an authority and its legitimization drastically increased in independent Georgia. It is not at all surprising that its influence was much bigger on the generation that was growing up and forming their personalities at that time. This can account mainly for the greater importance of religion for youth.

Results of the study in regard to the interest in politics and religion differ from results of similar studies undertaken in other countries. The great interest in politics was demonstrated by persons in older adulthood, while it usually is shown by people in middle adulthood. Studies carried out elsewhere in the world show a high involvement of older adults in religious activities, whereas in Georgia religious activity characterizes the younger generation more.

It can be summarized that the shift of value orientations in young adults is obvious. It is directed from Collectivism and to a lesser degree towards Post-Materialism and can be assumed to be the product of on-going political and socio-economic changes. The low level of trust towards others, little readiness of the public to take responsibility for the development of the country, low participation in voluntary organi-

zations, all pose a serious challenge to democratic transition. However the considerable educational resources of the population, the globalization of information accessibility and use of social media all seem to compensate to a certain degree for effects of economic austerity, and to speed up the conditions favorable for democratic development.

For the development of democracy in the country providing opportunities to adolescents for acquiring the experience of participation is of a paramount importance. Therefore the schools have to pursue the policy aimed at the inclusion of youth in acting for public good. School programs should as well reflect materials targeted at the increase of generalized trust to others.

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